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Abstract 
Bridging the technology divide remains one of the contemporary business issues, yet limited 
scholarly attention has been devoted to exploring the gap between regional developing nations. This 
study examined the state of technological progress in Africa by applying an innovative two-step 
total factor productivity (TFP) analysis. We first estimated the TFP for 21 African countries with 
reference to South Africa (regional leader) and the United States (US) (international leader). We 
then applied the Phillips and Sul (2007) panel convergence tests. We found three convergence clubs 
with TFP levels relative to South Africa, where only most developed African countries have been 
able to catch-up. For TFP levels relative to the US, we found two convergence clubs and only a 
couple of countries have managed to make short-lived progress of catching-up. Our analysis has 
implications in terms of capitalising on new technology to create platforms for new businesses to 
flourish in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades or so, it has been demonstrated that technology catching-up can serve 
as a springboard for further industrialisation and faster economic development in developing 
economies  (see Fuchs & Horak, 2008; World Economic Outlook, 2017). By “catching-up”, we are 
referring to the bridging of the technological gap between lagging and leading nations (Perrez & 
Soete, 1988; Thutupalli & Iizuka, 2016). Indeed, emerging economies such as China, India and 
Brazil have successfully leapfrogged to the latest technologies in many sectors and have experienced 
sustainable economic development (Athreye & Cantwell, 2007; Buckley & Hashai, 2014; Lee, 2013; 
You & Sarantis, 2013). The catch-up process for lagging nations entails learning from leading 
nations to help absorb and diffuse technologies across the wider population (Malerba & Nelson, 
2011; Thutupalli & Iizuka, 2016). This is more so for least developed African nations to not only 
bridge the gap with neighbouring nations, but also with the rest of the world.  Indeed, bridging the 
technology divide has been regarded as one of the contemporary issues in the global economy (see 
World Development Report, 2016). 
In spite of growing body of research on technology catch-up (e.g., Buckley & Hashai, 2014; 
Castellacci, 2006; Lee, 2013; Zhang & Zhou, 2016), much of the existing literature offers limited 
insights on the different types of the technology divide between regional developing nations and 
between developing and leading nations (see Fuchs & Horak, 2008). Such analysis could enrich our 
understanding of the issue of technology and digital divides, and provides basis for better public 
policy formulation. In this paper, we attempt to address this lacuna in the literature by examining 
the nature and effects of technology divide between regional nations. 
We focus on Africa for two important reasons. First, although the post-colonial Africa has 
experienced an increased economic growth, foreign direct investment and trade with the rest of the 
world (Gui-Diby & Renard, 2015; Nyuur & Debrah, 2014; United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2010), it has increasingly become apparent that the future of Africa’s 
development and progress is partly predicated on its ability to bridge the so-called technology divide 
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not only between its nations, but also with those of other fast industrialising countries in Asia, Latin 
America, North America and Europe (see Alzouma, 2005).   
Second, despite solid pace of economic growth in recent decades, business failures in Africa 
remain regular occurrence (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016a; Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 2014). 
According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2015, 2016), Africa has the highest Business 
Discontinuation Rate compared with other continents in 2015 and 2016. One of the important 
environment factors that attribute to business failure is technological change (Hager et al., 1996; 
Tirole, 1988). Indeed, a growing body of knowledge has suggested that technology can unlock the 
potential of African industries and foster entrepreneurial development (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015). 
Therefore, bridging technology gap in African nations presents a critical challenge and an 
opportunity for African countries to create platforms for new businesses to flourish (see Amankwah-
Amoah, 2016b).  
To explore the issue, we apply an innovative two-stage approach to analyse total factor 
productivity (TFP) in Africa. Technology is a key non-input factor that drives the growth of TFP as 
using advanced technology to process input resources leads to higher efficiency of input utilisation, 
and hence greater value of outputs. As such, TFP is an excellent metric to analyse the state of 
technological catch-up and leapfrogging in Africa. We employ the superlative index number 
methodology (Caves, et al., 1982; Diewert & Morrison, 1986). Such an index has a number of 
desirable properties and is widely employed by both academics and practitioners. See, for example, 
OECD (2001) and Griffith et al. (2004).  
Thus, our estimation takes two stages. We first estimate the TFP for 21 African countries 
using the superlative index model. TFP are measured in relative terms to their regional leader South 
Africa and the global leader the US. At the second stage, we apply panel convergence tests on the 
TFP to analyse the panel and club convergence pattern. Specifically we employ the Phillips and Sul 
(2007) panel convergence method that is able to provide valuable information on the clustering 
pattern and the speed of convergence in TFP among African countries.  
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The study offers several contributions to technology and innovation literatures. First, in light 
of the global efforts towards bridging the technology divide, it is surprising that much of scholarly 
attention have been devoted to gaps between the world’s developed and developing nations. As such, 
our understanding of the gaps between regional developing nations remains limited. This study 
contributes to the literature on technology catch-up (Landini, et al., 2016; Lee & Lim, 2001) by 
examining the variation between regional nations as source of learning to facilitate technological 
leapfrogging. In addition, we also add to the growing body of research on the use panel convergence 
tests applying the Phillips and Sul (2007) panel convergence tests on the relative TFP.  
Furthermore, our analysis contributes to the literature by deepening our understanding of the 
important issue of technology catch-up and leapfrogging in Africa via a unique comparative regional 
and global perspective. Thus, we also shed light on the phenomenon of high business failure rates 
in Africa by looking at whether Africa’s regional and global technology catch-up has been 
successful. 
The rest of the article is presented as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
technology catch-up and leapfrogging. Section 3 describes the relevant empirical data used. Section 
4 describes the analytical approach. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and Section 6 provides 
conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Technology catch-up and leapfrogging 
Governments and international organisations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
have long recognised the central role of technology in driving productivity and economic 
development (Wong & Goh, 2012). Through investments in technology, the newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs) in Asia including South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were able to make the 
successful transition from traditional agriculture and primary commodities dependent economy to 
advanced and knowledge-based economy (Wong & Goh, 2015). To catch up with the forerunner, 
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Lee and Lim (2001) suggest that, a latecomer has the choices of: a) following the path of the 
forerunners, b) skip stages of the path, or c) even create one of their own. The first option, path 
following approach, has the advantage of low costs of catching-up by adopting technologies that the 
forerunners no longer wish to keep because they now have low productivity. The second one, stage-
skipping means that the latecomers skip the older technology to adopt the most up-to-date-ones, but 
this approach is costly and faces competition from the incumbent.  The third option is one that the 
latecomers create their path of technology development by adopting the new generation of 
technology. Hence, the latecomers might have windows of opportunity to leapfrog the technology 
incumbents.  
According to Perrez & Soete (1988), technology latecomers have the windows of opportunity 
to catch up or even leapfrog the forerunners when there is a paradigmatic change of technology due 
to either a disruptive shift in market demand or a major change of institutional factors, such as 
governmental intervention. During this window of opportunity, the incumbents might be locked into 
existing technologies, institutional routine and work practice, whereas the newcomers do not have 
those burdens and thus can skip the existing technologies to adopt the latest ones to capture the new 
market demands when supported by appropriate new institutional frameworks (Morrison & 
Rabellotti, 2016). Nevertheless, path-creating is risky, as the new technology might not be stable, 
and may have low productivity and high costs at the initial stage (Lee & Ki, 2016).  
There have been successive catch-up cycles since the beginning of capitalism (Landini, el al., 
2016). A standard catch-up cycle consists of four stages: entry, gradual catching-up, forging ahead, 
and falling behind (Lee & Malerba, 2016). According to Landini et al. (2016), there are several 
variations of catch-up cycle in different industries. For example, there have been ‘persistent 
leadership cycles’ in the camera and memory chips industries (Kang & Song, 2016) and 
‘coexistence of leadership’ and the ‘return of the old leadership’ in the wine industry (Morrison & 
Rabellotti, 2016). Finally, there are many cases of ‘aborted catch-up’, where the latecomers were 
stuck at the stage of gradual catch-up or ceased to catch-up. 
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Abramovitz (1986) argued that both ‘technological congruence’ and ‘social capability’ are 
important for technology catch up by an emerging economy. Technological congruence refers the 
conditions in common with technology leader economies including factors such as availability of 
inputs and market demand. Social capability refers to factors education infrastructure, technical 
competence and the wider institutional factors (Morrison & Rabellotti, 2016). As such, catching up 
with the technology forerunners is more than mere adoption of new technology, but also it requires 
creativity and innovation (Lee & Lim, 2001; Morrison & Rabellotti, 2016). Wong & Goh (2015) 
suggested two models of technology catch-up in Asian countries: a) the model of supporting local 
new start-ups, such as those adopted by South Korea and Taiwan; and b) the model of learning from 
foreign direct investment (FDI) such as Singapore, China and Malaysia. 
Observing the change of technology leadership at sectoral level, Lee & Malerba (2016) 
suggested that there have been successive changes of technology leadership between forerunners 
and latecomers indicating substantive reduced differences in market share between firms in 
developed country and those in latecomer country. At national level, Ahn (2016) recently 
demonstrated how Korea’s technology policies help the country from catch-up development to 
advanced economy by adopting an institutional framework of consecutive value-based 
technological forecasting. Szczygielski, et al. (2017) assessed the efficiency of innovation support 
for firms in two technology-follower countries Turkey and Poland, and found that grants for 
research and development activities are helpful in improving firm performance in both countries. 
Using ‘National System of Innovation’ framework, Guennif & Ramani (2012) revealed the 
divergence between India and Brazil in pharmaceutical technology catch-up, with India being more 
successful than Brazil. 
 
2.2. Total factor productivity and club convergence  
The process of a latecomer country catches up with a forerunner country described as a process 
of convergence, which is an implication of neo-classical growth theory and a central topic in growth 
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literature (Diamond, 1965; Islam, 2003; Solow, 1956). It posits when poorer countries grow at a 
faster rate than richer ones, they will eventually reach a unique equilibrium, a common balanced 
growth path. There has been growing research attentions paid on cross-country convergence since 
1990s, to examine whether the latecomer countries were catching up with the forerunners (Dal 
Bianco, 2016). Researchers have examined convergence from different approaches, for example, 
income-convergence versus TFP-convergence, global convergence versus local or club 
convergence (Islam, 2003).  
TFP-convergence is a commonly used one to examine technology catch-up (e.g. Dowrick & 
Nguyen, 1989; Madsen, 2007; Misra, et al., 2015; Wolff, 1991), this is because TFP closely reflects 
the levels of technology development (Islam, 2003). As suggested by Romer (1990), the growth of 
TFP is driven by technology development as a result of investment by profit-maximising agents. In 
a study of convergence of TFP among the OECD countries over the period 1870 to 2004, Madsen 
(2007) found that 93% of the increase in TFP from the catching-up countries has been solely due to 
technology spillover from forerunner countries to latecomer countries. Technology spillover across 
countries are mainly through the channels of foreign direct investment and international trade  
(Keller, 2004). Research has shown that the more advanced of technology content in production, 
the faster growth and greater convergence rate (Dal Bianco, 2016).   
Earlier empirical evidence also shows the different patterns of growth and countries do not 
converge at a common unique equilibrium: some countries persistently grow faster over a long 
period of time, some grow at a moderate rate, while many countries persistently suffer the lowest 
growth rate (Azariadis & Drazen, 1990). Consequently, a group of countries that reach a particular 
equilibrium and a unique common growth path will form a convergence club, and as such there exist 
multiple clubs of convergence in the world’s economy (Baumol, 1986; Durlauf & Johnson, 1995; 
Galor, 1996). Bernard & Jones (1996) have demonstrated that the potential for productivity growth 
is both country and sector specific. Park, et al. (2015) recently examined the level of digitalisation 
convergence across countries, using information and communication technology development index. 
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They revealed three convergence clubs, with the group of the highest level of convergence showed 
the lowest speed of convergence, while the group of lowest convergence level showed the fastest 
speed of convergence. 
 
2.3. Technology development across African countries 
Government plays a central role in driving technology catch-up or leapfrog (Amankwah-
Amoah & Sarpong, 2016). As shown by Galang (2012), government inefficiency could inhibits 
technology penetration, exacerbating the technology gaps between technology forerunner countries 
and the latecomers. In the past twenty years, African country governments have made efforts to 
integrate with the world market, and progress has been made in technology development and 
economic growth (Menyah, et al., 2014). Recent investigation by Amankwah-Amoah and Sarpong 
(2016) on solar technology development in Ghana during the period of 1980-2010 indicates an 
increased level of government involvement in technology adoption through tax relief and subsidies 
and a growth of public-private partnerships in technology management. However, because of policy 
ineptitude, the efforts made by government have not been fully conducive to technology transfer 
from in the increased inflow of FDI in Africa (Osabutey & Debrah, 2012). Unlike the newly 
industrialized countries in East Asia, Africa countries in general still lag behind in technology and 
innovation, and consequently economic development (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015).  
Other major barriers to African countries’ technological development are identified as lack of 
trade openness and poor financial system (Menyah Nazlioglu, & Wolde-Rufael, 2014). Amankwah-
Amoah (2015) revealed that despite the opportunities of technology leapfrogging, lack of access to 
financing has restricted technological adoption in African countries. Financial system in Africa is 
still dominated by government-controlled banks, with little competition and as such resources 
allocation is highly political rather than based on economic considerations (Menyah, et al., 2014; 
Murinde, 2012; Ndulu, 2007). Trade openness or market liberalisation encourages international 
business and attracts foreign direct investment (FDI) which is essential for technology transfer to 
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the host countries (Blalock & Simon, 2009; Girma, 2005; Pack & Saggi, 1997). Yet, as revealed by 
Osabutey, et al. (2014) that there are many critical weaknesses that inhibit technology transfer 
between foreign and local firms in Africa: the lack of management capability, overreliance on 
foreign inputs, limited collaboration between foreign and host country firms, outdated government 
regulations and limited enforcement capacity. 
 
2.4. Technology catch-up and business failures in Africa 
As mentioned earlier, Africa has the highest Business Discontinuation Rate compared with other 
continents in 2015 and 2016 (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2015, 2016). Many studies have 
pointed out possible factors that might have contributed to this phenomenon (See Fatoki (2014) for 
a recent review on this issue)1. A number of studies have highlighted that lack of technology is a 
critical factor causing business failures in Africa (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Tushabomwe-
Kazooba, 2006; Phaladi & Thwala, 2008; Scheers, 2011; Seeletse, 2012). Some business owners 
generally believe that technology is unaffordable or expensive luxury (Seeletse, 2012), and others 
may simply be constrained financially (Scheers, 2011).  Furthermore, in a recent study carried out 
by the World Bank (i.e., Kelly & Firestone, 2016) that tracked 117 Tech Hubs across Africa, it is 
found that these Tech hubs, many of which have been created in the last few years, have 
demonstrated a high failure rate and varying degree of success. Therefore, faster and robust 
technology progress forms an important condition to mitigate business failures in Africa.       
 
3. Data description 
The main data-source for the present exercise is the most recent release of the Penn World Table 
(PWT 9.0). In the last forty years, the PWT has been a canonical source for comparable real GDP 
data across countries. More importantly, as explained by Feenstra et al. (2015), PWT 9.0 has three 
                                                 
1 According to Fatoki (2014), potential factors include both internal ones (i.e., lack of management experience, lack of 
functional skills, poor staff training and development, and poor attitudes towards customers) and external ones (i.e., 
non-availability of a logistics chain and a high cost of distribution, competition, rising costs of doing business, lack of 
finance, and crime. 
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main advantages with respect to its predecessors. First, it provides measures of real GDP from both 
the expenditure and the production sides. Therefore, by taking the latter indicator it is possible to 
evaluate and compare countries’ productive capacity. Second, PWT 9.0 encompasses capital stock 
series. This information, together with new data on real inputs (i.e. labour income in real terms), 
enables researchers to construct and compare TFP across countries. The third advantage of PWT9.0 
is that it employs interpolated price indexes. Hence, PWT9.0 provides measures of real GDP that 
correct for changing prices over time and it employs International Comparison Programme 
benchmarks from multiple years. Thus, all series calculated in “real terms” are made less sensitive 
to the choice of the base year, minimising the problem on real GDP estimates in non-benchmark 
years noted by Johnson et al. (2013). 
All the above improvements brought by PWT9.0 make such a dataset an extremely appealing 
choice for the calculation of technological efficiency in production as well as for evaluating its 
dynamic across countries and over time. It is therefore the database used in our analysis. 
In particular, the PWT9.0 series here employed are: 
• RGDPO: Output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in millions of 2011US$), this series is based 
on prices that are constant across countries and over time; 
• CGDPO: Output-side real GDP at current PPPs (in millions of 2011US$), this series is based 
on prices that are constant across countries in a given year; 
• CK: Capital stock at current PPPs (in millions of 2011US$); 
• EMP: Number of persons engaged (in millions); 
• HC: Human capital index, based on the average years of schooling from Barro & Lee(2012); 
• LABSH: Labour income of employees and self-employed workers as a share of nominal 
GDP 
It is worth noticing that, in order to make our TFP estimates comparable across countries and 
over time, we need to work with series that should be expressed at chained PPPs. This is problematic 
when capital stock series is considered, as PWT 9.0 reports it in current and not chained PPPs. To 
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overcome this difficulty, we combined the information on capital stock and GDP at current PPPs 
with the one of GDP at chained PPPs. In particular, we calculated the capital share, as the ratio of 
capital stock and the output-side real GDP, both expressed at current PPPs (i.e. K_share= CK/ 
CGDPO); then we multiplied such a ratio by the output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (i.e. 
RK=K_share* RGDPO). Thus, having obtained capital stock data that are expressed in chained 
PPPs, we were able to calculate TFP series that are comparable across countries and over time. This 
is explained in detail in Section 4.1. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. TFP estimation 
Our TFP estimates are obtained employing the superlative-index number methodology, as described 
in the seminal contributions of Diewert (1976) and Caves, et al. (1982). Such an index is superlative 
and transitive. The former implies that it provides a TFP measure that is as accurate as possible (i.e. 
it is not an approximation), and the latter ensures that the choice of the term of reference, which can 
be a country and/or year, is inconsequential. The transitivity property can be proved for the 
multilateral version of the index (see for details Mas & Stehrer, 2012) as well as for the generic base 
country j, as done by Feenstra et al. (2015). It allows us to isolate the productivity differences, 
among two (or more) countries, not explained by differences in productive inputs and thus, it 
provides a measure for technological progress that is comparable across countries.  
The above mentioned property of the TFP indexes allow researchers to obtain information 
on differences in TFP levels, rather than on growth rates. As stressed by Hall & Jones (1999), this 
is particularly important as cross-country differences in TFP growth rates have been shown to be as 
mostly transitory. By its very construction, the Törnqvist index used in our study measures the 
(output) distance between observed and efficient output. In the present work, we have assumed that 
there are two production possibility frontiers. One is regional and this is South Africa, while the 
other is international or global and this is the US.  
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South Africa has been Africa’s largest economy since 1997, only being taken over by small 
amount by Nigeria in period 2012-2016 (based on GDP (2010 constant US$) provided by the World 
Development Indicators). South Africa has relatively stable economic growth rate compared with 
most of other African countries, especially in the recent decade after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
More importantly, measured by GDP per capita (2010 constant US$) (World Development 
Indicators 1997-2016), South Africa is the economy with the highest living standard in the region 
since 1997. With regards to the level of technology, despite of recent mild slowing down in 
productivity growth compared with other African countries, South Africa remains the regional 
technological leader (Dessus et al., 2017). According to a recent report Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation (Ezell, et al., 2016), South Africa was ranked number 30 out of 56 countries 
in terms of its domestic policies supporting global innovation, highest for African countries and 
higher than its BRICS partners (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India and China). Indeed, as shown later, South 
Africa turns out to be the technological leader in Africa based on the superlative index method. 
Therefore, South Africa would be an appropriate regional benchmark for the purpose of 
investigating the process of technological catching-up within the region.   
As for the international leader, the US is widely recognised as the “world technological 
frontier” (Feenstra et al., 2015). Moreover, in a recent study by Tiruneh et al (2017), it is found that 
technology spillovers from the US have a stronger impact on labour productivity in African 
countries compared with any other developed countries. Some previous studies comparing African 
countries’ TFP with the one of the USA includes Van Dijk (2003) and Edwards & Golub (2003). 
Therefore, by doing the same our results also become comparable with the ones of the (scant) 
established literature.  
More formally, let us assume that production output of a generic country is a function of 
capital stock and employment and that the production function is translog with identical second-
order term; that constant returns to scale apply and that inputs are measured perfectly and in the 
same units for each observation. In symbols:  
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝛼3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)2 + 𝛼𝛼4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)2 + 𝛼𝛼5(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 
Where constant returns to scale hypothesis requires 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2 = 1  and 2𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛼𝛼5 = 2𝛼𝛼4 +
𝛼𝛼5 = 0. Further, perfect competition is assumed in both output and input markets. It is worth 
noticing that all the stated assumptions are necessary to derive the TFP superlative index number. 
Nonetheless, some progress have been recently made in incorporating imperfect competition into 
the measurement of productivity, see for example Burstein & Cravino (2015). 
Relying on the concept of distance function, Caves et al. (1982) derive the TFP index number 
for bilateral as well as multilateral comparisons. As for the TFP index for bilateral comparisons, it 
is assumed that there are two countries, b and c, where country b is the basis of comparison. The 
distance function Dc(Yb, Lb, Kb) represents the minimum proportional decrease in Yb such that the 
resulting output is producible with the inputs and productivity levels of c. Or, Dc(Yb, Lb, Kb) is the 
smallest input bundle capable of producing Yb using the technology in country c (i.e. 
, where Xb = (Kb, Lb) represents country b’s labour and 
capital input and Yb is the previously described translog production function. Caves et al (1982) 
show that the Mälmquist index (i.e. the geometric mean) of two distance functions for any two 
countries, c and b, provides a superlative and transitive index number for TFP. Superlative means 
that it is exact for the flexible aggregator function chosen (i.e. translog production function) and, 
thus, it is not an approximation (see for more details in Diewert, (1976) and its result on the use of 
Törnqvist-Theil approximation to the Divisia index (Törnqvist, 1936)). It is also worth noticing that 
an aggregator function is flexible if it can provide a second order approximation to an arbitrary twice 
differentiable linearly homogeneous function. Finally, thanks to transitivity, the choice of base 
country and year is inconsequential. Such desirable properties have made the superlative index 
number a well employed methodology for TFP calculation, see for example Harrigan (1997), 
Griffith et al. (2004) and Dal Bianco (2016). 
Drawing on these results, Feenstra et al. (2015) show that, the productivity level in country c 
relative to country b can be expressed as the ratio of output-side real GDP divided by the Törnqvist 
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index of factor endowments for the country of reference. As we are interested in TFP measures that 
are comparable across countries and over time, we employ the output-side real GDP at chained PPPs 
(i.e. RGDPO) rather than the output-side real GDP expressed at current PPPs (i.e. CGDPO). The 
same applies to our measure for capital stock, which is expressed in at chained PPPs US$ (i.e. RK). 
In symbols: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐
= �𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐
𝑜𝑜 � /𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  (1) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the Törnqvist index of factor endowments for the country of reference, which 
can be formally written as:  
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 12 (𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� + �1 − 12 (𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) �𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �� 
where b indexes the country of comparison, which in our case is either regional or the global 
technological leader; c represents the generic Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) country in the sample and 
t indexes any year between 1980 and 2014. For the meaning of all other variables please refer to the 
previous section.  
Taking into consideration the most up-to-date data (NSF, 2016), we chose the US and South 
Africa as our international and regional leader, respectively, for multilateral comparisons. South 
Africa exhibits the highest multilateral TFP index in almost all years relevant for our analysis, 
confirming the feasibility of it being considered as the regional technological leader. Multilateral 
TFP index calculations are not reported here but they are available upon request.  
Applying Equation (1), for both the regional and the international leader, we obtained two 
TFP series: TFP_SA and TFP_USA (i.e. productive efficiency of each SSA country, with respect 
to South Africa and USA, respectively). Figures 1 to 3 report such estimates. 
 
4.2. The Phillips and Sul convergence test 
The Phillips and Sul (P-S) (2007) method is based on a time-varying factor representation and hence 
it is capable of accommodating long-run co-movement in aggregate behavior outside the 
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cointegration framework and allowing for the modelling of transitional effects. Particularly, 
idiosyncratic factor loadings allow for individual heterogeneous and a period of transition in a path 
that is ultimately governed by some common long-run stochastic trend. Therefore, the P-S 
(2007) method can not only reveal the speed of convergence (if present) for the full panel, but also 
highlight the different extent and speed of the convergence in the sub-groups of members through 
its club formation procedure.  
 
Relative transition paths 
Consider a variable Xit where i=1,2,…,N; t=1,2,…,T. Following P-S (2007) the variable can be 
decomposed into git , the systematic components capturing the common components of cross-
sectional dependence in a panel, and ait,  the transitory components, as follows: 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐                                                            
P-S (2007) propose a time-varying loading factor representation: Xit = �git + aitµt � µ𝑐𝑐 = δitµt   for all i and t,                              (2)                               
where µt is a common component and δit is a time-varying idiosyncratic element that measures the 
economic distance between the common trend component µt and Xit at time t. Specifically, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 is 
modelled in a semi-parametric form implying non-stationary transitional behaviour in the following 
way:  
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)−1𝑡𝑡−𝛼𝛼,                                             (3) 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is fixed, 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 is iid(0, 1) across 𝑖𝑖 but weakly dependent over 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) is a slowly varying 
function (e.g., log  𝑡𝑡  ) for which 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) → ∞ as 𝑡𝑡 → ∞. Equation (3) ensures that 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 converges to 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 
for all 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0, which therefore becomes a null hypothesis of interest for a cross section unit. For a 
panel, the corresponding null hypothesis would become 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 → 𝛿𝛿 for some 𝛿𝛿 as 𝑡𝑡 → ∞ and 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0.  
The main procedure of the P-S (2007) convergence test is to calculate the time-varying load 
loadings δit such that we can determine the club convergence if this loadings converge. To do so, 
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P-S (2007) define the transition coefficient as hit and to extract the time varying factor loadings δit 
as follows: 
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
= 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
                                            (4) 
where hit is the transition parameter that measures δit in relation to the panel average at time t and 
therefore describes the transition path for individual i relative to the panel average. The Hodrick and 
Precott (H-P) (1997) filter is employed to remove the cyclical trend from the original data. The 
filtered transition parameter coefficients is denoted as ℎ�𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 while the extracted time trend as 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐.  
The most important part of the club convergence test is to construct the cross sectional 
variance ratio 𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
  where: 
𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐 = 1𝑁𝑁�(ℎ�𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 − 1)2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
P-S (2007) show that the transition distance Ht has a limiting form of: 
Ht~ AL(t)2t2α  as t → ∞ 
where A  is a positive constant, L(t) is a function of t and 𝛼𝛼 denotes the convergence speed. To test 
for the null hypothesis of convergence P-S (2007) perform the log t regressions which are explained 
next. 
   
The log t regression 
A simple regression-based testing procedure is proposed by P-S (2007) where the null hypothesis 
of convergence is: 
𝐿𝐿0: 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 and 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0 
against the alternative H1: δi ≠ δ for all i or α < 0 
Correspondingly, the following OLS regression is performed: 
𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 �
𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐
� − 2𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏� 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐                                     (4) 
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where 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡 + 1), the fitted coefficient of log t is b� = 2α�, and α� is the estimate of α in the 
null hypothesis. To account of the impact of initial conditions on the test the empirical regression 
run after a fraction of the sample is removed.  The data for this regression starts at some point t =[rT] with r > 0. P-S (2007) recommend r = 0.3. For inference purpose they employ a one-sided t 
test of null α ≥ 0  by using 𝑏𝑏�  and a standard error estimated using a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator. Given that the test statistic tb� is normally distributed, 
the decision rule for the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected if tb� < −1.65. 
 
Club convergence and clustering 
P-S (2007) argue that a strict rejection of the null of full panel convergence may not necessarily rule 
out the existence of sub-group convergence within the panel. They correspondingly develop a club 
convergence algorithm detect units of such clusters. The clustering algorithm is based on repeated log t regressions and contains four main steps which are described below. 
Step 1 (Ordering): Order the member (i.e. the Xit  series) in the panel according to the last 
observation. 
Step 2 (Core Group formation): Select the first k highest panel units are selected to form the 
subgroup 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘 for some 𝑁𝑁 > 𝑘𝑘 ≥  2. Calculate the convergence t-statistic tb�(k) for each k. the core 
group size k∗ is chosen by maximising tb�(k) under the condition that min{tb�(k)} > −1.65. If 𝑘𝑘∗ =
𝑁𝑁, there is full panel convergence. If 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙{𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐�(𝑘𝑘)} < −1.65 for𝑘𝑘 = 2, the first unit is dropped and 
same procedure for the remaining units is carried out. If 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙{𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐�(𝑘𝑘)} < −1.65 for every subsequent 
pair of units, there are no convergence clusters in the panel. In all other cases, a core group can be 
detected.  
Step 3 (Club Membership):  Select units for membership in the core group (Step 2) by adding one 
remaining units at a time to the core group and perform the logt test each time. If the associated t-
statistics is greater than zero (conservative choice), the new unit will be included in the current sub-
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group. If then the logt test for this sub-group shows 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐� > −1.65, the formation of this sub-group is 
confirmed.  
Step 4 (Recursion and Stopping): Perform the log t test on the group of units not selected in step 3. 
If this set of units converges, then the second club is formed.  Otherwise, repeat Steps 1 to 3 to 
reveal some sub-convergent clusters. If no sub-groups are found (Step 2), then the remaining units 
display divergent behaviour.  
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1. TFP estimation 
Figures 1 to 3 report our estimates of TFP for each SSA country. In particular, Figure 1 shows the 
TFP index with respect to South Africa, Figure 2 TFP index with respect to the US, and Figure 3 
compares the aforementioned two series. The corresponding descriptive statistics are reported in 
Table 1.  
Figure 1 shows that, exceptions made for Botswana, Mauritania, Namibia and Sudan (former), 
the technological performance of SSA countries has been much lower than their regional leader in 
the period considered. Expectedly, the levels are even lower when SSA countries are compared with 
the international leader, the US (Figure 2). Such graphical intuition is confirmed by the first two 
columns of Table 1, where it can be noticed that the majority of the countries exhibit a very low 
TFP. Further, the distribution of the indexes appears quite symmetric, as the mean and the median 
values are relatively close in almost all of the cases. For what concerns the four aforementioned 
exceptions, Botswana’s better than average technological performance can be explained considering 
its regional proximity with the regional leader, its favourable political institutions (i.e. stable and 
democratic) as well as its flourishing touristic sector (African Union, 2015). As for Mauritania, 
UNCTAD (2010) documents the historic and more present efforts to ensure technological 
development and capability building in order to promote sustainable growth and to avoid the 
resource course, possibly generated by a recent oil discovery. Passing to Namibia, it is quite 
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exceptional among SSA countries. Its German colonial origin and its political institutions have been 
proved to be conducive to economic growth and development. In particular, UNESCO (2005), 
UNICEF (2015) and different reports by the Namibian National Commission on Research Science 
and Technology document the strategic importance given to research promotion and development 
as well as to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), as development booster. 
Finally, as for Sudan, Nour (2013) documents that after the 1999 oil discovery, public spending 
increased sensibly. In particular, the share of development expenditure over total expenditure passed 
from 9% in 1999 to an average 24% between 2004 and 2009. Moreover, the same author shows that 
the 2000s have been a very important decade for Sudanese technological development. In particular, 
Nour (2013) provides evidence of government plans for boosting technological development, such 
as basic research conducted by public universities and coordinated by the Ministry of Scientific 
Research. In sum the descriptive evidence for Botswana, Mauritania, Namibia and Sudan indicates 
the importance of institutional development and the role of government in boosting technological 
development, as illustrated by Mazzuccato (2013). 
The catching-up tendencies in Figures 1-2 also show some interesting patterns. In particular, 
they are more evident in some cases (e.g. Namibia) than in others (e.g. Burundi and Cameroon). 
Moreover, it is interesting to notice the U-shaped pattern of Nigeria. In particular, Nigerian TFP 
seems to have been particularly high at the beginning of the sampled period, then declined and then 
rose mildly again. According to Onipede (2010), high TFP levels at the beginning of 1980s in 
Nigeria could be explained by 1981-1985 National Development Plan that aimed at diversifying the 
economy, modernising the agricultural sector, and accelerating technological development. In 1985, 
the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida came into power, with its austerity measures 
as well as the focus on the oil sector (Afolabi, 2008). Nigerian TFP index started rising again at the 
beginning of 2000s possibly due to the incredible growth of ICTs technologies and the diffusion of 
Internet. Specifically, in year 2000 the Nigerian government’s plan for the development of national 
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ICT was launched. This led to, among other things, the ICTs training of Nigerian workers by foreign 
firms, Chinese ones in particular2. 
 
5.2.  The Phillips and Sul convergence test results 
Once the above were completed, we then moved on to apply the 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 𝑡𝑡  convergence and club 
convergence tests to the relative TFP levels. Following the recommendation by P-S (2007), the 
convergence analysis was conducted on filtered data series in which the cyclical component of each 
series is removed by applying the H-P filter. As mentioned in Section 4.2, ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, the relative transition 
parameter, describes the transition path for country 𝑖𝑖 vis-à-vis the panel average. Correspondingly, 
the relative transition parameters with the cross sectional means in each of the convergent club 
would demonstrate one club’s behaviour in relation to the clubs’ average. Following P-S (2007), for 
convergent clubs, if present, we present their relative transition parameters. This procedure is very 
insightful as important inference can be drawn based on such visual illustration of each club’s 
relative transition path. 
We first report the full panel and club convergence tests results of the TFP levels relative to 
South African and the US (Table 2), then present the relative transition parameters of the 
corresponding convergence clubs (Figure 4 and Figure 5). The 𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 𝑡𝑡 convergence regression results 
presented in the upper panel of Table 2 suggest that, since 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐� < −1.65, the null of convergence is 
rejected in both the TFP levels of the 21 African countries relative to their regional leader South 
Africa and the global leader the US. It implies that there is no full panel convergence in both cases. 
We were not surprised by this finding as a full panel convergence would only be possible if the 
relative TFP levels of all countries have moved towards similar values via similar paths. This is 
clearly not the case, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
                                                 
2 We further calculated the TFP gap between SSA countries and South African and the US as one minus the relative 
TFP presented in Figures 1 and 2. However, given they the mirror image of the relative TFP and to save space, we do 
not present the TFP gaps here, although they are available upon request. For readers who are interested, we also carried 
out extra P-S convergence tests on TFP gaps and the results confirm the convergence tests on the relative TFP. 
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As earlier mentioned, an important advantage of the P-S (2007) method is that it is able to 
highlight the different extent and speed of the convergence in the sub-groups of countries through 
its process of club formation. The lower panel of Table 2 presents the results of such club 
convergence tests.  
For the TFP level of the 21 African countries relative to their regional leader South Africa, 
three convergent clubs are detected. Club 1 includes Botswana, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria and 
Sudan (Former). Club 2 includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Senegal and the U.R. of Tanzania: Mainland. Club 3 includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo and Zimbabwe. The speed of convergence, 
measured by the value of 𝑏𝑏�, shows an interesting decaying order, with Club 1 has the highest speed 
of convergence, followed by Club 2 and Club 3. Given that Club 1 contains most countries with the 
highest TFP level African countries in our sample and Club 3 contains lowest, it seems that in Africa, 
the speed of catching up within countries with already high existing TFP level are much faster than 
that of the ones with low TFP level.  In all three clubs  𝑏𝑏� < 2 and thus there is convergence in rates 
(conditional convergence) rather than convergence in levels (absolute convergence).  
Examining this time the corresponding club transition paths as indicated by the relative 
transition parameters in Figure 43, countries in Club 1 have the highest level of relative TFP 
compared with other two clubs throughout our sample period. However, there had been a dip from 
1980 to early 1990s. This could be mainly due to the substantial decline in relative TFP level in 
Nigeria during this period (Figure 1). Nigeria had negative GDP growth in 7 years during the period 
1980-1991. Negative GDP growth occurred again in 1995 but then it grew at a fast pace for the rest 
of our sample period (average grow rate was 6.8% during 1996-2014 according to the World Bank). 
The relative level of TFP of Club 1 had started to increase after the mid-1995 until the end of our 
sample period, indicating countries in Club 1 had been catching up fast with their regional leader 
                                                 
3 To save space, here we do not present the individual transition parameter for each country. They are available upon 
request.  
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South Africa. In contrast, the relative TFP level of countries in Club 3 show an opposite trajectory. 
There had been short lived trend in growth from 1980 to end of the 1980s and then a declining trend 
took over for the rest of the years. It implies that compared with other African countries (especially 
compared with countries in Club 1), the catching-up between Club 3 countries and their reginal 
leader South Africa is missing. In terms of Club 2, it is interesting to observe that the trajectory has 
remained stable, only showing a fairly slow trend of growth during the mid-1990s until early 2000s 
but it reversed to very slow trend of declining since mid-2000s. Overall, the relative TFP level for 
the three clubs had been moving towards each other during the period 1980-the early 1990s but they 
had drifted apart since then. By 2014, their distance had been larger than 1980.  
Moving on to the case of TFP levels of the 21 African countries relative to the international 
leader, i.e., the US, we observed a re-configuration of convergent clubs. There are now two clubs 
with Club 1 including the same countries as Club 1 in the case of TFP levels relative to the regional 
leader South Africa and Club 2 merges countries in the previous Clubs 2 and 3. Similar though to 
the TFP levels relative to South Africa, we observed rate (conditional) convergence rather than level 
(absolute) convergence (since in all cases 𝑏𝑏� < 2). However, it is important to point out that the value 
of 𝑏𝑏� for Club 1 countries in the case of TFP levels relative to the US is much higher (𝑏𝑏� = 1.847) 
than the same countries in the case of TFP levels relative to South Africa (𝑏𝑏� = 1.206). It implies 
that for this group of countries, their TFP level is converging faster to the international leader the 
US than their regional leader South Africa. This could be due to that the level of countries in Club 
1 had been growing in a pace that is quite fast. For instance, the TFP level of Namibia has surpassed 
that of the regional leader South Africa in last three years of our sample period 2012-2014 (Figure 
1), although on average the TFP level of Namibia is still lower than that of South Africa. 
Consequently, a faster speed of convergence between Club 1 countries with US than with South 
Africa is observed. With regards to Club 2 where the rest of the 17 countries are included, we 
observe a speed of convergence (𝑏𝑏� = 0.245) that is much lower than Club 1, most likely led by a 
much slower growth in TFP level compared with countries in Club 1.  
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The transition paths of these two clubs are depicted in Figure 5. The two clubs exhibited 
opposite transition paths, with Club 1 far above Club 2 throughout the sample period. It is interesting 
to observe that until the mid-1990s, the relative transition paths of Clubs 1 and 2 had been actually 
moving towards each other. It perhaps reflected the decline in relative TFP levels in some Club 1 
countries during this period, such as Nigeria and Mauritania, and the increase in relative TFP levels 
in come Club 2 countries, such as Lesotho, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, despite relative TFP levels 
are higher in Club 1 than in Club 2. However, such trends have reversed since the mid-1990s. The 
relative transition paths of these two clubs have started to diverge since the mid-1990s and only 
towards the end of the sample period the gap between these two clubs has ceased increasing, 
stabilising at levels slightly higher than ones observed in 1980.  
To summarise, we observed some of these systematic patterns in Figures 4 and 5. Looking 
specifically at a regional perspective, first, there are three convergent clubs including the most 
developed (Club 1), less developed (Club 2) and least developed African countries (Club 3) in our 
sample. Second, there had been signs of these three clubs converging towards each other during 
1980 to the mid-1990s, which implies that the least developed African countries in our sample is 
doing rather well in terms of catching-up with their regional leader South Africa when compared 
with the most and less developed peers in Africa. Third, however, during the mid-1990s to 2014, 
we observed a divergent picture. Specifically, club including the most developed countries are 
leading the way of catching-up with their regional leader South Africa, while the less developed 
African countries are just maintaining their position when measured by their relative TFP to South 
Africa. Unfortunately, the least developed African countries (e.g., Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe) seem 
to have lost the momentum and their TFP growth have been too slow such that they have become 
increasingly lagging behind the most developed African countries club.   
We now turn to the results on the TFP level relative to the international leader the US. First, 
the most developed African countries again stand out forming the first club but now all the rest of 
the countries form the second club. Second, similar to the relative to South Africa case, the two 
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clubs converge between 1980-the mid-1990s, and then diverge again. It echoes that many African 
countries in Club 2 have exhibited TFP that became much lower than the US after mid-1990s (e.g., 
Senegal and Zimbabwe) while countries in Club 1 had made some progress in catching-up with the 
US (e.g., Namibia and Nigeria), albeit slow or short-lived. Third, there is not a middle group whose 
TFP level has remained stable compared with other clubs compared with Figure 4. Therefore, 
although overall progress of SSA countries catching-up with the US is missing, there are 
nevertheless a handful of countries have made some progress, albeit short-lived.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the issue of technology catch-up in Africa using an innovative two-step 
approach. Specifically, we used most recent annual data from the Penn World Table (PWT 9.0) and 
employed the superlative-index number methodology. Based on this, we first estimated TFP for a 
sample of 21 African countries with reference to their regional leader, South Africa, as well as the 
international leader, the US. At regional level, we uncovered clear evidence of technological 
catching-up process for a small group of countries in our panel (e.g., Botswana, Mauritania, Namibia 
and Sudan (former)) with their regional leader South Africa, whilst for the rest of the countries signs 
of catching-up are only observed towards the end of our sample period. When compared with the 
US, the majority of SSA countries have simply remained their levels of relative TFP. In many cases, 
declining TFP relative to the US is shown (e.g., Central African Republic, Senegal and Sierra Leone). 
Even for countries that are doing well in catching-up at regional level, i.e., Botswana, Mauritania, 
Namibia and Sudan  (former), either their catching-up with the US is quite short-lived, or only 
occurred towards the end of our sample period. It shows the technological level of SSA as a whole 
(including regional leader South Africa) has not been growing as fast as the US and hence catching-
up at international level seems to be missing. It may be that the limited progress in the catch-up 
process is rather attributed to factor endowment, level of education and technology/knowledge 
transfer and economic factors. Indeed, as suggested by Tiruneh et al. (2017), technology spillovers 
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from the US to Africa is influenced by human capital stock and government stability in the recipient 
countries. It could also be a result of lacking intraregional growth spillovers within Africa (as 
suggested by Roberts & Deichman (2011)) and deteriorated global environment after 2008 (as 
suggested by Drummond & Ramirez (2009)).  
We then applied the P-S panel convergence tests to our TFP estimates to reveal whole panel 
and club convergence information. It enabled us to understand whether TFP levels of SSA countries 
are moving towards the regional and international leader together as a whole, or in the form of 
various clubs that have different trajectories and speeds of convergence. As expected, there was no 
full panel convergence in both cases of SSA TFP levels relative to South Africa and the US. The 
following club convergence tests detected three and two convergence clubs in the former and latter 
case, respectively. With regards to TFP level relative to South Africa, the three clubs generally 
include most developed (Club 1), less developed (Club 2) and least developed African countries 
(Club 3), with the three corresponding relative transition parameters first converging but then 
became divergent again towards the end of our sample period. It implies underneath the overall 
evidence of regional catching-up process, the least developed SSA countries have initially done well 
up until the early 1990s but then lost their momentum, whilst a few most developed SSA countries 
have kept up with the catching-up and others simply maintained their positions. The results on the 
TFP level relative to the US were more polarised, with the relative transition parameters of Club 1 
and 2 moving in opposite directions in the past twenty years. It suggests that although progress of 
catching-up with the US was missing for SSA countries as a whole, there had been nevertheless a 
handful of SSA countries (in Club 1) are performing better than others, making some progress of 
catching-up, albeit short-lived.  
From public policy standpoint, there is evidence of regional catching-up with South Africa, 
but less developed African countries (Club 3) seem to have lost momentum of TFP growth. In this 
direction, it would be useful to promote help within the SSA group, i.e., more advanced SSA 
countries (Club 1) assist countries in Club 2 showing them experiences in catching–up. This 
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reinforces the arguments that technology catch-up process entails learning from leading nations and 
providing the conditions for knowledge diffusion and best practices to spread among nations 
(Malerba & Nelson, 2011; Lall, 1996). Given today’s uncertain global environment, knowing the 
nature of the gap between African countries and leading global leader would help in designing 
sector-specific policy measures to boost access to technology and thereby creating platform for 
faster technology diffusion.  
Overall, the evidence of global catching-up with the US is missing. SSA group (including 
South Africa) as a whole needs to refer to other developing countries’ (e.g., China, India) catching-
up experiences (see Mathews 2002; Lall, 1996). In both cases least developed SSA countries seem 
to lagging further away from most developed SSA countries, regionally and internationally. This is 
an undesirable trend in SSA. Ultimately, new policy framework is needed to reduce such divergence 
among SSA countries (see Archibugi & Pietrobelli, 2003; Lall, 1996; World Development Report, 
2016). It is also worth mentioning that our findings of generally missing evidence of regional and 
global catching-up in Africa provide an important explanation to high business failures in the region 
given that lack of technological progress had been widely regarded as one of the key causes of high 
business failures in Africa (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Tushabomwe-Kazooba, 2006; Phaladi 
& Thwala, 2008; Scheers, 2011; Seeletse, 2012).   
We are aware that measurement issues concerning output and productive inputs are common 
to both deterministic and econometric methodologies aimed at retrieving information on 
productivity (Del Gatto et al., 2009; Rogers, 1998), including our superlative index method. Also 
despite the advantages of the P-S panel convergence method in revealing club clustering pattern and 
speed of convergence, it does not have the scope to identify various factors that might have 
contributed to the absent of technology catch-up progress in Africa. Hence future research could 
explore a range of factors such as legal and economic factors to examine whether they have 
contributed to enlarging the gaps between some nations and global leaders. Future research could 
also investigate whether the nature of political system plays a role in helping some countries leap 
27 
 
forward whilst constraining others. One way of examining the impact of above mentioned factors 
on technological catching-up process in Africa could be dividing African countries according to 
their industrial, institutional, technological adoption, legal and political differences. We hope that 
this study ignites new streams of research on technology catch-up in emerging economies. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  TFP_SA TFP_USA 
           Benin      
Mean 0.2909802 0.1966304 
Median 0.2906771 0.1702889 
Maximum 0.4660735 0.4395684 
Minimum 0.2199607 0.1387797 
Number of Observations 35 35 
        Botswana      
Mean 0.8096915 0.6608095 
Median 0.8429845 0.6737211 
Maximum 0.9889211 0.8025104 
Minimum 0.5678385 0.5032665 
Number of Observations 35 35 
    Burkina Faso      
Mean 0.2756344 0.1722768 
Median 0.2790177 0.1706553 
Maximum 0.4155149 0.1960814 
Minimum 0.1776824 0.1454464 
Number of Observations 35 35 
         Burundi      
Mean 0.1367011 0.0873494 
Median 0.1352447 0.0751355 
Maximum 0.1721141 0.1265213 
Minimum 0.1019527 0.0553256 
Number of Observations 35 35 
        Cameroon      
Mean 0.3944267 0.2684829 
Median 0.3772379 0.2320437 
Maximum 0.5403602 0.4629935 
Minimum 0.3305539 0.1783067 
Number of Observations 35 35 
Central African  Republic     
Mean 0.2439072 0.1669105 
Median 0.2402265 0.1490158 
Maximum 0.292052 0.2652029 
Minimum 0.152301 0.0723804 
Number of Observations 35 35 
  Côte d'Ivoire      
Mean 0.477681 0.3251667 
Median 0.4758664 0.3043459 
Maximum 0.6263941 0.4709648 
Minimum 0.4016889 0.2299595 
Number of Observations 35 35 
           Kenya      
Mean 0.3760165 0.2545811 
Median 0.3869716 0.2339388 
Maximum 0.4548615 0.3626483 
35 
 
Minimum 0.2850235 0.1615371 
Number of Observations 35 35 
         Lesotho      
Mean 0.3257718 0.2069298 
Median 0.3479946 0.2089126 
Maximum 0.4866043 0.2881996 
Minimum 0.1857186 0.1592675 
Number of Observations 35 35 
      Mauritania      
Mean 0.657216 0.4888618 
Median 0.657271 0.4801381 
Maximum 0.8806421 0.6689813 
Minimum 0.5133324 0.3763455 
Number of Observations 35 35 
      Mozambique      
Mean 0.1844163 0.1106018 
Median 0.1580817 0.1096722 
Maximum 0.3350926 0.1502064 
Minimum 0.1129534 0.0819352 
Number of Observations 35 35 
         Namibia      
Mean 0.8243832 0.6271617 
Median 0.7918647 0.5958016 
Maximum 1.228441 0.8955015 
Minimum 0.7011731 0.4872546 
Number of Observations 35 35 
           Niger      
Mean 0.2094169 0.1473945 
Median 0.2085695 0.125293 
Maximum 0.2958543 0.289123 
Minimum 0.1611198 0.092648 
Number of Observations 35 35 
         Nigeria      
Mean 0.576528 0.4272999 
Median 0.4305341 0.3065856 
Maximum 1.101284 1.136953 
Minimum 0.1372096 0.0769681 
Number of Observations 35 35 
          Rwanda      
Mean 0.1590709 0.1013032 
Median 0.1635983 0.0909715 
Maximum 0.2121833 0.1709019 
Minimum 0.0848303 0.0502672 
Number of Observations 35 35 
         Senegal      
Mean 0.4775298 0.3532398 
Median 0.462993 0.2989357 
Maximum 0.6134823 0.5355789 
36 
 
Minimum 0.4031922 0.2582985 
Number of Observations 35 35 
    Sierra Leone      
Mean 0.3137777 0.2059317 
Median 0.3006586 0.1901999 
Maximum 0.4941975 0.3021186 
Minimum 0.2023001 0.1189953 
Number of Observations 35 35 
    South Africa      
Mean 1 0.8118886 
Median 1 0.7700467 
Maximum 1 1.100582 
Minimum 1 0.5695519 
Number of Observations 35 35 
  Sudan (Former)      
Mean 0.6346405 0.3980356 
Median 0.592432 0.4004868 
Maximum 0.9469448 0.5039065 
Minimum 0.4644083 0.2881898 
Number of Observations 35 35 
            Togo      
Mean 0.1891569 0.1256604 
Median 0.1864335 0.1060688 
Maximum 0.2959647 0.2660652 
Minimum 0.1355309 0.0716577 
Number of Observations 35 35 
U.R. of Tanzania      
Mean 0.2400317 0.1602191 
Median 0.2315707 0.1535171 
Maximum 0.3696643 0.2700768 
Minimum 0.143688 0.1104226 
Number of Observations 35 35 
        Zimbabwe      
Mean 0.4137519 0.2794097 
Median 0.4462293 0.3623066 
Maximum 0.7920439 0.5380499 
Minimum 0.1012043 0.0518569 
Number of Observations 35 35 
           Total      
Mean 0.4186695 0.2989157 
Median 0.3423338 0.2158904 
Maximum 1.228441 1.136953 
Minimum 0.0848303 0.0502672 
Number of Observations 770 770 
Note: TFP_SA denotes productive efficiency of each SSA country with respect to South Africa; 
TFP_USA denotes productive efficiency of each SSA country with respect to the USA. 
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Table 2: log 𝑡𝑡 convergence and club convergence tests results for the relative TFP level indicators 
(1980-2014) log 𝑡𝑡 convergence tests 
TFP levels relative to the regional leader 
South Africa 
 TFP levels relative to the international 
leader the USA 
𝑏𝑏� : − 0.958 
𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡:−35.134∗  𝑏𝑏� : − 0.878  𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡:−91.054∗ 
club convergence tests 
TFP levels relative to the regional leader 
South Africa 
 TFP levels relative to the international 
leader the USA 
 
Club 1 
𝑏𝑏�: 1.206           𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡: 2.276 
 
 
 
Botswana 
Mauritania 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Sudan (Former) 
  
Botswana 
Mauritania 
Namibia 
Nigeria           
Sudan (Former) 
 
Club 1 
𝑏𝑏�: 1.847 
𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡: 3.792  
 
Club 2 
𝑏𝑏�: 0.501 
   𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡: 8.893 
Benin  
Burkina Faso  
Côte d'Ivoire  
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Senegal  
U.R. of Tanzania: Mainland 
 Benin  
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal  
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
U.R. of Tanzania: Mainland 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Club 2 
𝑏𝑏�: 0.245 
𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡: 5.621 
 
 
 
 
 
Club 3 
𝑏𝑏�: 0.182           𝑡𝑡- 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡: 1.805 
 
 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Kenya 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Zimbabwe 
 
Note: * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level.  
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Figure 1: TFP superlative index number, country of reference South Africa 
 
 
 
Figure 2: TFP superlative index number, country of reference USA 
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Figure 3: TFP_SA and TFP_USA 
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Figure 4: Relative transition paths across clubs based on the TFP level relative to the regional leader 
South Africa (1990-2014) 
  
 
 
Figure 5: Relative transition paths across clubs based on the TFP level relative to the international 
leader the USA (1990-2014) 
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